This paper derives the restrictions imposed by Barro and Gordon s theory of time-consistent monetary policy on a bivariate time-series model for in ation and unemployment and tests those restrictions using quarterly US data from 1960 through 1997. The results show that the data are consistent with the theory s implications for the long-run behavior of the two variables, indicating that the theory can explain in ation s initial rise and subsequent fall over the past four decades. The results also suggest that the theory must be extended to account more fully for the short-run dynamics that appear in the data.
: E31, E52, E61. King and Watson (1994) nd that a similar picture emerges when the data are passed through a lter that is optimally designed to isolate long-run trends. Parkin (1993) also suggests that the time-consistency problem can explain the behavior of history: the rst, a period of rising in ation that extends from the early 1960s through the early 1980s, and the second, a period of falling in ation that begins in the early 1980s and continues to the present day. These two long-run trends appear more clearly in the 10-year centered moving average that is also displayed in gure 1. Why did US policymakers allow in ation to drift higher throughout the 1960s, 1970s, and early 1980s? And, conversely, what factors have contributed to their ability to bring in ation down more recently? Barro and Gordon s (1983) celebrated model of time-consistent monetary policy offers answers to these questions. In Barro and Gordon s model, a policymaker desires to reduce unemployment and, lacking the ability to commit in advance to a monetary policy rule, is tempted to do so in each period by creating surprise in ation in an effort to exploit an expectational Phillips curve. Private agents in the model have rational expectations, however; they recognize that the government faces this temptation to in ate and adjust their decisions accordingly. In equilibrium, therefore, unemployment is no lower than it would otherwise be, and yet the rate of in ation is inefficiently high. Moreover, given the convex costs assigned to unemployment in the model, the policymaker s temptation to in ate and hence the magnitude of the in ationary bias itself becomes increasingly signi cant as the natural rate of unemployment rises. Interpreting their model as a positive theory of monetary policy, Barro and Gordon argue that an upward trend in the natural rate of unemployment during the 1960s and 1970s allows their theory to account for the coincident upward trend in in ation.
In fact, estimates of the time-varying natural rate of unemployment constructed, for example, by Gordon (1997) and Staiger, Stock, and Watson (1997) typically indicate not only that the natural rate followed an upward trend during the 1960s, 1970s, and early 1980s but also that the natural rate has reversed course and fallen since then. Indeed, gure 2 shows that trends appear in the actual civilian unemployment rate that parallel those found in in ation.
Figures 1 and 2, therefore, suggest that Barro and Gordon s model can potentially explain in ation s initial rise and subsequent fall over the past four decades. They call out for a more detailed analysis that uses the Barro-Gordon model as a basis for statistical tests of the hypothesis that the time-consistency problem underlies the behavior of in ation in the United States. This paper performs such an analysis. Accordingly, the following sections outline a version (2) where and is serially uncorrelated and normally distributed with mean zero and standard deviation .
The monetary authority cannot commit to a policy rule. Instead, at the beginning of each period , after private agents have formed their expectation but before the realization of the real shock , the policymaker chooses a planned rate of in ation . Actual in ation for the period is then determined as the sum of and a control error , so that (1 2)( ) + ( 2) 
where is serially uncorrelated and normally distributed with mean zero, standard deviation , and covariance with . The policymaker selects in an effort to minimize a loss function that penalizes variations of unemployment and in ation around target values and zero:
with and so that, in particular, the policymaker wishes to push the actual unemployment rate below the natural rate. Using (1) and (3), the policymaker s problem becomes where denotes the expectation at the beginning of period or, equivalently, at the end of period . The rst-order condition for this problem is (4) Private agents know the structure of the economy and understand the policymaker s time-consistency problem. In equilibrium, therefore, they correctly anticipate the policymaker s actions, so that . Using this equilibrium condition, along with the fact that , (4) simpli es to ,
where If the policymaker could commit to a policy rule at the beginning of time, he would choose a planned rate of in ation equal to zero in every period. Thus, (5) reveals that the in ationary bias resulting from the policymaker s inability to commit depends positively on the expected natural rate . Here, as in Barro and Gordon s original model, the equilibrium in ation rate moves together with the natural rate of unemployment.
Equations (1), (3), and (5) imply that (6) which shows how the control error for in ation allows the actual unemployment rate to uctuate, in equilibrium, around the natural rate. Combining (6) with (2) yields (7) 
where denotes the change in the natural rate during period . Equations (2), (3), and (5), meanwhile, imply that (8) Separately, (7) and (8) indicate that both in ation and unemployment are nonstationary, inheriting unit roots from the underlying process for the natural rate. Together, however, they imply that (9) which shows that a linear combination of in ation and unemployment is stationary. Equation (9), therefore, summarizes the constraint that Barro and Gordon s theory imposes on the long-run behavior of in ation and unemployment: according to the model, these variables should be nonstationary but cointegrated. A statistical test of this cointegration constraint will determine whether the BarroGordon model can successfully explain in ation s initial rise and subsequent fall over the past four decades.
Taking rst differences of (6), solving for , and substituting the result into (2) yields (10) where denotes the change in the actual unemployment rate during period . Together, (9) and (10) can be written in the form of a vector ARMA(1,2) for the stationary linear combination of in ation and unemployment and the stationary change in unemployment:
The within-equation and cross-equation restrictions appearing in (11) summarize the constraints that Barro and Gordon s theory imposes on the short-run behavior of in ation and unemployment. A statistical test of these restrictions will determine how well the Barro-Gordon model explains the dynamic relationships between these two variables that can be found in the data. This section tests the cointegration constraint shown in (9) to see whether the time-consistency problem can explain the long-run behavior of in ation and unemployment in the United States. In addition, it tests the restrictions shown in (11) to assess the model s ability to account for the short-run dynamics that appear in the data. Both sets of statistical tests use quarterly, seasonally-adjusted data that are drawn from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis FRED database. The in ation rate is measured, as in gure 1, using quarter-to-quarter changes in the GDP implicit price de ator; the unemployment rate is measured, as in gure 2, using the civilian unemployment rate. King and Watson (1997) nd evidence of a signi cant break in the time-series behavior of in ation and unemployment occurring around 1970. Therefore, all tests are performed with data from both the full sample period, 1960:1-1997:2, and the subsample beginning in 1970:1.
Equations (7) and (8) show that according to the model, both the in ation rate and the unemployment rate ought to be nonstationary. Thus, table 1 reports results from the Phillips-Perron (1988) test described by Hamilton (1994, Ch.17) , applied to check for unit roots in the two series. The table shows estimates of , the slope coefficient from a regression of each variable on a constant and its own lagged value, as well as , the conventional -statistic for testing the hypothesis that . The Phillips-Perron statistic, denoted , adjusts the conventional -statistic to allow for serial correlation in the regression error. This adjustment uses Newey and West s (1987) method to estimate the variance of the regression error; Andrews (1991) method is used to select a value for the lag truncation parameter required to form the Newey-West estimator, assuming that the process for the regression error is well-approximated by a rst-order autoregression.
The results show that the null hypothesis that the process for unemployment contains a unit root cannot be rejected in either sample period. The results for in ation are a little less clear. In the full sample, the unit root hypothesis for in ation can be rejected, but only at the 0.10 signi cance level; in the post-1970 sample, the unit root hypothesis cannot be rejected. Based on these results, along with the others presented below, it seems appropriate to regard both in ation and unemployment as nonstationary. The strong evidence that unemployment is nonstationary, together with the strong evidence that in ation and unemployment are cointegrated, supports the hypothesis, accepted above, that in ation is nonstationary. Table 2 reports results from the Phillips-Ouliaris (1990) test described by Hamilton (1994, Ch.19) , applied to check for the cointegrating relationship between in ation and unemployment implied by (9). The table shows estimates of , the coefficient from a regression of on , along with the statistics needed to test for a unit root in the residual from this regression. For both sample periods, the hypothesis that in ation and unemployment are not cointegrated can be rejected at the 0.05 signi cance level.
One potential drawback of the residual-based, Phillips-Ouliaris test, also discussed by Hamilton (1994, pp.589-590) , concerns the fact that the results may hinge sensitively on which variable, in ation or unemployment, appears as the dependent variable in the initial regression. Here, however, (9) indicates that the hypothesized cointegrating relationship is of the form , making in ation the obvious choice of dependent variable. Nevertheless, the robustness of the Phillips-Ouliaris test results is easily established using Johansen s (1988) maximum likelihood approach, described by Hamilton (1994, Ch.20) , which does not require a choice of normalization.
Thus, table 2 also reports statistics associated with the Johansen test for cointegration: the two eigenvalues and used in evaluating Johansen s likelihood function, the estimates of the cointegrating vector for and , and the likelihood ratio statistic used to test the null hypothesis of no cointegration. The results of the Johansen tests con rm those of the PhillipsOuliaris tests, rejecting the null hypothesis of no cointegration between in ation and unemployment at the 0.01 signi cance level for the full sample and at the 0.05 signi cance level for the post-1970 sample.
Thus, the results in table 2 strongly support the Barro-Gordon model s implications for the long-run behavior of in ation and unemployment; as predicted by (9), the two variables are cointegrated. These results are, in particular, consistent with the view that in ation s initial rise and subsequent fall over the past four decades can be explained by the Federal Reserve s inability to commit to a monetary policy that reduces its temptation to exploit the Phillips curve. When coupled with the upward trend in unemployment during the 1960s, 1970s, and early 1980s, this inability to commit yields a coincident rise in in ation; when coupled with the downward trend in unemployment since the early 1980s, this inability to commit yields a coincident fall in in ation. 
Testing the Short-Run Restrictions
This conclusion must be accepted with some caution, however: when con dence intervals are placed around the estimates of , the implied values for are not necessarily less than one.
The 16 parameters of the unconstrained model include , the parameter in the cointegrating relationship, the four autoregresive parameters, the eight moving-average parameters, and the three distinct parameters in the covariance matrix for the innovations.
Focusing now on the theory s implications for the short-run behavior of in ation and unemployment, table 3 presents maximum likelihood estimates of the model s parameters, obtained by mapping (11), the constrained AMRA(1,2) for and , into state-space form and using the Kalman lter to evaluate the likelihood function, as suggested by Hamilton (1994, Ch.13 ). The parameter estimates are stable across the two sample periods. Moreover, the standard errors, computed by taking the square roots of the diagonal elements of the inverted matrix of the maximized log likelihood function s second derivatives, are small, implying that each parameter is estimated with a fair degree of accuracy.
The estimates of suggest that the Phillips curve is quite steep, with each percentage-point of surprise in ation generating a fall in the unemployment rate of only 0.15 percentage points. Although the parameters and are not individually identi ed, the estimates of exceed unity; the restriction then implies that must be less than one. Evidently, the Federal Reserve placed more weight on its goals for unemployment than on its goals for in ation over both sample periods.
The estimates of are positive, as expected. Finally, the positive estimates of the covariance indicate that unfavorable shocks to the natural rate tend to coincide with unfavorable shocks to in ation; these estimates support the idea that represents a real, or supplyside, disturbance.
The within-equation and cross-equation restrictions that appear in (11) may be tested by comparing the t of the constrained ARMA(1,2) to the t of an unconstrained ARMA(1,2) of the same form. The constrained model has 6 parameters, while an unconstrained ARMA(1,2) for a stationary linear combination of in ation and unemployment of the form and the stationary change in unemployment has 16 parameters. Thus, the theory places 10 restrictions on a bivariate time-series model for these stationary variables: if denotes the maximized value of the log likelihood function for the constrained model, and if denotes the maximized value of the log likelihood function for the unconstrained model, then the likelihood ratio statistic has a chi-square distribution with 10 degrees of freedom under the null hypothesis that the constraints hold. Table 3 shows that for the full sample and for the post-1970 subsample. The 0.001 critical value for a chi-square random variable with 10 degrees of freedom is 29.6. Thus, the likelihood ratio tests overwhelmingly reject the model s short-run restrictions in (11).
What is the source of this massive rejection of the model s dynamic restrictions? According to (9) which is also the rst equation in (11) the stationary linear combination of in ation and unemployment identi ed by the model ought to be serially uncorrelated. The values of reported in the top panel of table 2, however, indicate that , while stationary, is also highly persistent. Clearly, Barro and Gordon s model must be extended to explain this persistence if it is to provide a more accurate characterization of the dynamic behavior of in ation and unemployment.
Given the large number of restrictions that appear in (11), however, it comes as no surprise that statistical tests reject the constrained model. After all, the underlying theory is described by three simple equations, listed above as (1)- (3); it would be unreasonable to expect this simple structure to account for all of the dynamics that can be found in the data. More impressive, therefore, is the fact that the time-series model (11) that is implied by this simple theory can be used to obtain reasonable, stable, and precise estimates of the parameters listed in table 3. Does the time-consistency problem explain the behavior of in ation in the United States? Barro and Gordon s (1983) model of time-consistent monetary policy implies that long-run trends in the natural rate of unemployment will introduce similar trends into the in ation rate when the central bank cannot commit to a monetary policy rule. The tests results presented above, which indicate that in ation and unemployment are cointegrated, are consistent with this implication. Thus, at a minimum, the results suggest that the answer to the question posed in this paper is yes, that the time-consistency problem may underlie in ation s initial rise and subsequent fall over the past four decades.
Tests of the model s short-run restrictions, also presented above, indicate that the model is less successful at accounting for the dynamic, quarter-to-quarter comovement of in ation and unemployment in the United States. The version of Barro and Gordon s model used here, however, is extremely simple; consisting 6 7 6 7 Broadbent and Barro (1997) make some progress in this direction by extending the original Barro-Gordon model to provide a more detailed description of the economy and of the exogenous shocks that hit the economy. But while Broadbent and Barro successfully estimate this extended model via maximum likelihood, they do not test its restrictions nor do they comment more generally on its ability to explain the behavior of in ation in the United States. Clearly, more work needs to be done along these lines. Sargent (1997) also explores this idea.
of just three linear equations, it makes no attempt, for instance, to explain the lagged but highly persistent effects on both real and nominal variables that are frequently associated with monetary policy in the US economy. As surveys by Blackburn and Christensen (1989) and Rogoff (1989) make clear, Barro and Gordon s model has already been extended in a variety of ways in order to produce additional insights into the optimal design of monetary policymaking procedures and institutions. Perhaps, similarly, the model can be extended to more accurately capture the short-run behavior of in ation and unemployment.
Looking forward, what implications do the results obtained here have for monetary policy in the United States? DeLong (1997) and Taylor (1997) argue that the behavior of in ation in the US economy is attributable not to the timeconsistency problem, but to the gradual process through which policymakers and academic economists learn about the economy. They suggest that during the 1960s and 1970s, as academic economists came to believe in an exploitable Phillips curve trade-off, policymakers were encouraged to accept a higher rate of in ation in exchange for a lower rate of unemployment; the failure of this experiment then paved the way for the rational expectations revolution and the more recent era of lower in ation. According to this view, the fundamental source of high in ation economists and policymakers ignorance about the structure of the economy has been removed; hence, the in ationary experiences of the 1960s and 1970s will not be repeated.
The theory and evidence presented here do not invite such optimism. According to the Barro-Gordon model, the in ation of the 1960s and 1970s has as its proximate cause a string of bad luck, in the form of a series of negative and persistent supply-side shocks that worked to increase the natural rate of unemployment. Similarly, from the viewpoint of this model, the disin ation of the 1980s and 1990s represents the product of good luck, in the form of a series of positive and persistent supply-side shocks that have worked to decrease the natural rate. According to this alternative view, therefore, nothing fundamental has changed. The Fed must receive a mandate that allows it to place less weight 
